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NAVIGATING THE SECOND AMENDMENT CROSSFIRE: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT TRIGGERS WORKING METHODOLOGY IN UNITED
STATES v. MARZZARELLA AND UNITED STATES v. BARTON
KATHERINE L. JUDKINS*
I. OPENING SHOTS
When Michael Marzzarella received a call on an afternoon in April of
2006, he thought it was just another eager customer looking to purchase a
stolen firearm.1 Unbeknownst to Mr. Marzzarella, the caller inquiring
about a pistol was actually a confidential informant (“CI”) working with
the police.2 The CI had caught wind of Marzzarella’s business in “trafficking stolen handguns” and had informed the police that Marzzarella carried a stolen semi-automatic pistol with the serial number ground off.3
Unfortunately for Mr. Marzzarella, he agreed on a sale.4 The following day he met the CI and an undercover state trooper, who bought the
pistol for two hundred dollars.5 Perhaps he wanted to build a rapport
with his new customer, because when the trooper purchased a handgun
from him the next month, Marzzarella helpfully informed him that the
serial number could be easily “ground off.”6 This business came to an end
when Marzzarella was indicted and convicted for possessing an unmarked
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).7 Marzzarella challenged his
conviction, asserting that the statute violated his Second Amendment
rights and was therefore unconstitutional.8
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law.
1. See Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85
(3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3185), 2009 WL 5635544 (describing call where informant
“inquire[d] about the availability for sale of” stolen firearm).
2. See id. (describing CI’s call to Marzzarella); see also United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (describing facts of case).
3. See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 5 (stating informant’s findings). Marzzarella would pick up the stolen firearms from his associate “Gat Man”
before selling them from his home. See id. (explaining trafficking business).
4. See id. (describing sale arrangement).
5. See id. (noting sale of “fully functional” firearm).
6. See id. (reciting Marzzarella’s instruction to trooper “that the firearm’s serial number could be ground off so that it, too, would be obliterated”).
7. See id. (describing arrest and conviction). The relevant part of the statute
reads: “It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to transport, ship, or receive . . . any firearm which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered or to possess or receive any firearm which has
had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2006).
8. See United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 597–98 (W.D. Pa.
2009) (discussing Second Amendment claim). For a discussion of the case on appeal, see infra notes 83–99 and accompanying text.
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The Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”9 For almost a century, this provision was
understood as protecting a collective right, as opposed to an individual
right, to keep and bear arms.10 In District of Columbia v. Heller,11 the Supreme Court fundamentally altered this interpretation, holding that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right.12
Heller ignited a wave of litigation as more and more defendants, like
Marzzarella, claimed their convictions violated their individual right under
the Second Amendment.13 The lower courts were caught unprepared—
Heller did not outline the scope of this new individual right, nor did it
articulate the standard of review to be applied to Second Amendment
challenges.14 Courts had the crucial task of protecting this new individual
right, as well as shielding against risks of gun violence and threats to public safety, all without a set legal framework.15 Faced with a new and unsettled area of law, courts diverged in their approaches and applications of
Heller.16
This Casebrief analyzes the Third Circuit’s approach to Second
Amendment challenges in the aftermath of Heller.17 Part II surveys the
Supreme Court’s early Second Amendment case law and the lower courts’

9. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
10. See, e.g., Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and the Second
Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010) (describing collective right theory that was
“broadly accepted for nearly a century”). The Framers wanted to ensure that Congress did not “assert too much power over the several states” through the army.
Id.; see also Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A
Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 4–5 (2000) (discussing widely accepted collective
right view in lower courts after Miller). Under this theory, the Second Amendment’s purpose was to create a militia to protect against the nation’s standing
army. See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 487–88 (2004) (noting Second
Amendment allowed “states to preserve their well regulated militias against the
threat of disarmament by the federal government”).
11. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
12. See id. at 595 (ruling Second Amendment protects individual right).
13. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 596, 598 (noting after Heller, “numerous defendants prosecuted under the federal firearms laws” challenged convictions under Second Amendment). For a further discussion of the litigation
following Heller, see infra notes 59–80 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of Heller’s lack of guidance in these two areas, see infra
notes 59–65, 195, and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the risks of gun violence, see infra notes 82, 153, and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of these divergent approaches, see infra notes 61–81 and
accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s approach to Second Amendment
challenges, see infra notes 83–105 and accompanying text.
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applications of that precedent.18 Part III discusses the Heller decision and
the lower courts’ varying interpretations.19 Part IV discusses the Third
Circuit’s recent decisions in United States v. Marzzarella20 and United States
v. Barton,21 examining the framework they establish for analyzing Second
Amendment challenges.22 Part V analyzes the impact of both cases on the
Third Circuit’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on potential
strategies for practitioners.23 Part VI examines how the Third Circuit’s
approach has provided guidance to its sister circuits.24 Additionally, Part
VI emphasizes the significance of the Third Circuit’s approach in an unsettled area of law.25
II. THE LEGAL BATTLEGROUND
A.

Pre-Heller: The Miller Misfire

Before Heller, the Supreme Court addressed the Second Amendment
in a handful of cases, none of which involved an extensive analysis of its
meaning.26 The Court made its only major statement about the Second
Amendment’s scope in 1939 with United States v. Miller.27 There, the Court
18. For a discussion of Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence
before Heller, see infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. For lower courts’ interpretations, see infra notes 30–46 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the Heller decision, see infra notes 47–55 and accompanying text. For the effect on the lower courts, see infra notes 59–82 and accompanying text.
20. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011).
21. 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).
22. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s Second Amendment framework,
see infra notes 83–105 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s impact on practitioners, see infra
notes 108–83 and accompanying text. Second Amendment challenges are not limited to criminal defendants, but because Marzzarella and Barton both dealt with
criminal convictions, that is how this Casebrief’s analysis is framed. Most of the
practitioner strategies can be employed outside the criminal context as new Second Amendment issues arise. See, e.g., Right to Carry/Discretionary Licensing,
COMM2A, http://comm2a.org/discretionary-licensing-right-to-carry (last visited
Feb. 12, 2012) (describing recent challenges to gun permit laws).
24. For a discussion of Third Circuit guidance to other circuits, see infra notes
186–96 and accompanying text.
25. For conclusions about the impact of the Third Circuit’s approach, see
infra notes 184–85, 196, and accompanying text.
26. See Benforado, supra note 10, at 12 (noting only three instances before
Heller that Supreme Court examined Second Amendment); Sarah Perkins, Note,
District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L.
REV. 1061, 1062 (2010) (“The Second Amendment has rarely surfaced in litigation
before the Supreme Court.”).
27. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). See also Kenneth A. Klukowski, Note, Armed by Right:
The Emerging Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 167,
170 (2008) (“The Supreme Court has only made one significant statement about
the meaning of the Second Amendment.”). The Court upheld a federal law
prohibiting the transport of short-barreled shotguns across state lines against the
defendant’s Second Amendment challenge. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (finding
regulation constitutional).
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reasoned that the Second Amendment’s purpose was to foster an effective
militia.28 Finding no evidence that short-barreled shotguns had any “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia,” the Supreme Court ruled that a ban on those weapons did not
implicate the Second Amendment.29
B.

The Collective Right Theory: Bulletproof Reasoning, or Missing the Target?

Following Miller, the lower courts interpreted the Second Amendment as only protecting a collective right.30 Firearm regulation challenges
usually turned on whether the weapon’s use had “a reasonable relationship” to militia service.31 Miller was met with some criticism, though, because the opinion narrowly focused on the specific facts of the case and
provided little insight into the meaning of the Second Amendment.32 Because the collective view controlled in most cases, courts did not discuss
the scope of the Second Amendment right, or apply a standard of re-

28. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (stating “obvious purpose” of Second Amendment was “to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [the
militia]”).
29. See id. (“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of [short-barreled shotguns] . . . has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”).
30. See, e.g., Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment,
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 366 (2000) (noting under collective view, “the Second
Amendment affects citizens only in connection with . . . a government-organized
and regulated militia”).
31. See, e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982)
(noting Second Amendment right “inextricably connected to the preservation of a
militia”); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (ruling Second Amendment protects collective right); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144,
149 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding Second Amendment only applies to State’s right to
arm militia).
32. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (characterizing Miller as “cryptic”), abrogated by United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111
(2010); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting
Miller was “not entirely illuminating”), abrogated by United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d
803 (2009); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (characterizing Miller as “already outdated” and not “attempting to formulate a general rule
applicable to all cases”); Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1543
(2009) (noting Miller “failed to rule specifically whether this right was individual or
collective” but focused on facts at hand).
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view.33 There were cases, however, that discussed limitations to the Second Amendment unrelated to the collective view.34
First, the lower courts recognized that there was no absolute right to
bear arms.35 The Third Circuit addressed this limitation in United States v.
Rybar.36 There, the court upheld a statute that prohibited the transfer or
possession of machine guns against the defendant’s Second Amendment
challenge.37 The Third Circuit had “neither the license nor the inclination” to decide if Miller was wrong, but instead emphasized that there was
“no absolute right to firearms” under the Second Amendment.38
Next, the lower courts were consistent in their favorable treatment of
felon dispossession statutes.39 The Third Circuit discussed the Second
Amendment in the context of a felon’s challenge in United States v.
33. See, e.g., Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun
Control Legislation, 58 MONT. L. REV. 79, 108 (1997) (noting “little need” for scrutiny standard under collective view, but under individual view “there would be
many cases to review because almost all gun control laws could be challenged . . . .”); Jay R. Wagner, Comment, Gun Control Legislation and the Intent of the
Second Amendment: To What Extent Is There an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms?,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1407, 1445–46 (1992) (describing how lower courts “closed the
door on constitutional scrutiny of individual possession of firearms” after Miller).
34. For a discussion of these limitations, see infra notes 35–43 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to “wade into [the] Second Amendment quagmire” of analysis because “rights
under the amendment can be restricted”); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115,
128 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting right to possess firearm is not fundamental); United
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 107 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding Second Amendment
“does not constitute an absolute barrier to . . . regulation of firearms”); United
States v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding no absolute right
to firearms); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 36–37 (8th Cir. 1972) (“[I]t has
been settled that the Second Amendment is not an absolute bar to congressional
regulation of the use or possession of firearms.”).
36. 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996).
37. See id. at 276, 286 (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1),
making it “unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun”).
38. See id. at 286 (“[T]his court has on several occasions emphasized that the
Second Amendment furnishes no absolute right to firearms.”). In a later case, the
Third Circuit upheld a statute prohibiting possession of a machine gun. See
United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding statute). The court glossed over the Second Amendment challenge stating: “We will
not linger on this point inasmuch as a number of our cases” emphasize there is “no
absolute right to firearms” under the Second Amendment. See id. (drawing on
rationale of past decisions).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Three Winchester 30–30 Caliber Lever Action
Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288, 1290 n.5 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding no merit in claim that
felon dispossession statute violated Second Amendment right); United States v.
Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (upholding constitutionality of felon
dispossession statute); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 36–37 (8th Cir. 1972)
(concluding that felon dispossession statute did not violate Second Amendment);
United States v. Cole, 276 F. Supp. 2d 146, 150 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding no authority to support claim that “a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms violates the Second Amendment”).
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Graves.40 The defendant objected to his conviction for making false statements on a gun registration form.41 He did not assert the Second Amendment as a defense, but the Third Circuit briefly discussed the nature of the
right anyway.42 The court acknowledged that “any regulation may” violate
the Second Amendment, but in applying the collective right theory, other
courts “consistently have found no conflict between federal gun laws and
the Second Amendment.”43
Only if there was an individual right protected by the Second Amendment would the need for an in-depth analysis arise.44 The notion of an
individual right faced heavy debate and commentary, and from the second
half of the twentieth century onward, an increasing number of publications reflected a departure from the collective view to the individual right
view.45 The criticisms of Miller, discussions of an individual right by lower
courts, and the increasingly sharp cry from scholarly works all called for

40. 554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1977).
41. See id. at 67 (noting Graves wrote “he had not been convicted of a [felony]” even though he had been). Graves was convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a)(6) for “knowingly” making false statement “in connection with the acquisition of firearms.” See id. (describing defendant’s conviction).
42. See id. at 66 n.2 (discussing whether Second Amendment right would be
violated).
43. Id. (“Arguably, any regulation of firearms may be violative of [the Second
Amendment].”). Had Graves raised the Second Amendment, Miller would have
controlled the analysis. See id. (noting adherence to collective right theory); see also
United States v. Tot, 28 F. Supp. 900, 901, 903 (D.N.J. 1939) (holding Second
Amendment not implicated by federal act making it “unlawful for any person who
has been convicted of a crime of violence . . . to receive any firearm or ammunition” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1934))).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding
Second Amendment not implicated because gun dealer had not shown any “connection with militia-related activity”). The Third Circuit’s analysis did not extend
much further than what the collective right theory would allow. See Eckert v. Pennsylvania, 331 F. Supp. 1361, 1362 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding no Second Amendment
right unless firearm “bears a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia”), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). Some circuits addressed the possibility of an individual right but applied the collective right
theory. See United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting possibility of individual right); Cole, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (addressing merit to defendant’s argument that Second Amendment protects individual right). The Fifth
Circuit was the first to recognize an individual Second Amendment right. See
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding Second
Amendment protects individual right).
45. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 26, at 1063 (describing scholarly debate on
“nature of the right protected by the Second Amendment during the twentieth
century”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62
TENN. L. REV. 461, 461 (1995) (noting “explosion of scholarship” on Second
Amendment from increased attention to gun control debates); Spitzer, supra note
30, at 367–68 (providing detailed discussion about how individualist view flourished in scholarship).
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the Supreme Court to revisit the true meaning of the Second
Amendment.46
III. AN INDIVIDUAL SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT:
NO LONGER OUT OF RANGE
A.

The Supreme Court Pulls the Trigger

After nearly seventy years of silence, the Supreme Court directly addressed the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment in 2008 with Heller. Dick Heller was a D.C. police officer with authorization to carry a
handgun on duty, but could not register to keep a handgun in his home.47
Heller’s request to keep a gun at home was denied because D.C. law prohibited the registration of handguns, and no one was permitted to carry a
handgun without a license.48 In addition, lawfully owned firearms were
required to be kept “unloaded or disassembled” in the home.49 Heller
challenged all three provisions on Second Amendment grounds, claiming
a right to use “functional firearms” for self-defense in the home.50
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms.51 The
D.C. statutes violated that right because they made it impossible for citizens to use firearms for the “core lawful purpose of self-defense.”52 The
Court stressed, however, that this right was not without its limits.53 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia listed several “presumptively lawful” reg46. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 33, at 1458–59 (arguing that Supreme Court
“should take the next opportunity . . . to reverse the long line of cases denying any
individual right to keep and bear arms”).
47. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008) (reviewing
facts of case).
48. See id. at 574–75 (describing D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001) (prohibiting handgun registration) and section 22-4504 (prohibiting unlicensed
carrying)).
49. See id. at 575 (describing section 7-2507.02, which requires firearms be
kept “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device” if
kept at home).
50. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (asserting right to
possess firearms “readily accessible to be used effectively when necessary” for selfdefense). The District Court dismissed the complaint, but the appellate court reversed, holding the city’s laws violated the Second Amendment’s individual right.
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (noting procedural history).
51. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of
both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right
to keep and bear arms.”).
52. See id. at 629–30 (noting “handguns are the most popular weapon chosen
by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use
is invalid”). The requirement that all firearms in the home “be rendered and kept
inoperable” made it impossible to use them for self-defense. Id. at 630 (explaining
why statutes were unconstitutional).
53. See id. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”).
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ulations that could survive a constitutional challenge.54 This
“nonexhaustive” list was subject to intense criticism, but it formed the basis
for adjudication by the lower courts faced with this new individual right.55
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Heller in McDonald v. City of Chicago.56
A plurality of the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the Second Amendment to the States.57 In the
wake of Heller and McDonald, lower courts were bombarded with firearm
regulation challenges, now that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to bear arms.58
B.

Lower Courts Stare Down the Barrel of Uncertainty

Heller jolted the lower courts out of the collective right theory and
into a new area of law riddled with uncertainty and litigation.59 The decision left important questions unanswered, causing widespread confusion
amongst the lower courts.60 Specifically, Heller did not outline the scope
of the new Second Amendment right, nor did it provide the standard of
review courts should apply to Second Amendment challenges.61
54. See id. at 626–27 n.26 (naming “presumptively lawful” measures). The
Court listed: “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626–27(same).
55. See id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory
measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”); Lawrence
Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny
Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 444–45 (2011) (criticizing list as being “inconsistent with the Court’s originalist analysis”). For a discussion of Heller’s list in subsequent litigation, see infra notes 62–72 and
accompanying text.
56. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). Chicago residents were precluded from keeping
firearms in their homes for self-defense. See id. at 3026 (describing ordinance that
said, “?[n]o person shall . . . possess . . . any firearm unless such person is the
holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm.’ ” (alteration in original)
(quoting Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8–20–040(a) (2009))). The code also
“prohibit[ed] registration of most handguns, thus effectively banning handgun
possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City.” Id. (describing
section 8–20–050(c) of ordinance).
57. See id. at 3036–37 (holding right to bear arms is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition” and thus is incorporated by Due Process Clause
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
58. For a discussion of the ensuing litigation, see infra notes 59, 186–91 and
accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations
After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1141 (2011) (noting “[h]undreds
of challenges to gun regulations” after Heller); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1565 (2009) (describing “avalanche of challenges” as defendants “saw Heller as a get out of jail free card”).
60. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 32, at 1549 (“Heller has simultaneously clarified
and clouded the constitutional mystery surrounding the Second Amendment.”).
61. See Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What
the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L.
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In determining whether a regulation fell inside the Second Amendment’s scope, the lower courts focused on Heller’s list of “presumptively
lawful” measures.62 The Supreme Court provided little guidance on how
to interpret and apply this list.63 Heller “hit[ ] the reset button,” leaving
the lower courts to call the shots on what is protected and what is not.64
Faced with a widely unsettled area of law, the circuits split in their interpretations of Heller and developed different methods of analysis.65
One important divide comes from the Supreme Court’s failure to explain why certain regulations were deemed “presumptively lawful.”66 The
lower courts have articulated two rationales for this classification. First,
regulations are “presumptively lawful” because they regulate conduct
outside the scope of Second Amendment protection.67 Second, these
measures are “presumptively lawful” because they pass any level of scru-

REV. 547, 593 (2009) (stating Heller “provided closure as to one issue” but left open
issues of Second Amendment’s scope and standard of review); Gould, supra note
32, at 1537 (noting after Heller, lower courts were “deluged with Second Amendment claims,” but had “little explicit guidance” from Supreme Court “as to how to
rule on these challenges”).
62. See Civil Rights: The Heller Case, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 293, 309–10
(2009) (“Heller has led to a considerable wave of litigation in the lower federal
courts,” which rely on this “laundry list” of exceptions to uphold regulations);
David T. Hardy, The Rise and Demise of the “Collective Right” Interpretation of the Second
Amendment, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315, 317 (2011) (describing how after Heller, lower
courts “quickly turned to determining the parameters of the right which they had
previously thought nonexistent”).
63. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 679 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating majority left “for future cases the formidable task of defining
the scope of permissible regulations”); Cass Sunstein, America’s 21st Century Gun
Right, BOS. GLOBE (June 26, 2008), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial
_opinion/oped/articles/2008/06/26/americas_21st_century_gun_right/ (noting
courts “will now see many years of efforts to decide the scope” of Second
Amendment).
64. Anna Stolley Persky, An Unsteady Finger on Gun Control Laws: Despite 2nd
Amendment Cases, Firearms Codes Are Moving Targets, 96 A.B.A. J. 14 (2010) (discussing Heller’s minimal guidance regarding scope); see, e.g., Adam Winkler, Heller’s
Fallout: The Court’s Decision Raises More Legal Questions than It Answers, NAT’L J. ONLINE (July 17, 2008), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/heller-s-fallout20080717 (stating Heller provided “a few sentences that seem to suggest . . . what
might be allowed and what might not be allowed”).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2010) (“But
Heller did not purport to fully define all the contours of the Second Amendment,
and accordingly, much of the scope of the right remains unsettled.” (citation
omitted)).
66. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 413 (2009) (noting lack of explanation
makes it “difficult to discern the principles or values behind Heller’s carve-outs”).
67. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (finding “presumptively lawful” means statutes that “regulate conduct outside the scope of the Second Amendment”); see,
e.g., United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011) (adopting Marzzarella’s reading of “presumptively lawful”).
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tiny.68 Despite this discrepancy, the circuits have been consistent in upholding “presumptively lawful” regulations.69 This is true even though
some circuits disagree on whether Heller’s list is dicta or binding.70 The
true problem is that this muddy understanding of “presumptively lawful”
will directly impact the way courts approach Second Amendment challenges.71 When a court faces an issue not addressed by Heller, or another
circuit, an unclear understanding of what “presumptively lawful” means
could lead to divided results.72
Heller’s failure to set a standard of review left the lower courts in further disarray.73 The Supreme Court seemed to reject rational basis, leaving intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny available.74 The majority of
circuits have applied intermediate scrutiny, but the rationales for doing so
differ.75 Some find Heller’s list of exclusions to be incompatible with strict
68. See Gould, supra note 32, at 1560 (arguing measures are “presumptively
lawful” because they pass all levels of scrutiny).
69. See Kiehl, supra note 59, at 1142 (noting how lower courts consistently
uphold gun regulations against challenges regardless of approach used). For a
further description of the lower courts’ treatment of “presumptively lawful” regulations, see infra notes 189, 191, and accompanying text.
70. Compare United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010)
(characterizing list as dicta), and United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047
(10th Cir. 2009) (same), with United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th
Cir. 2010) (ruling language is not dicta), and United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). Courts characterizing Heller’s list as dicta still
rely on it to uphold firearm regulations. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168,
171 (3d Cir. 2011) (listing courts that rely on Heller’s “dicta”). The Third Circuit
characterizes the list as binding. See id. at 171 (ruling Heller’s list not dicta).
71. See, e.g., Barton, 633 F.3d at 172 (rejecting facial challenge under presumption that “felon dispossession statutes regulate” unprotected conduct); Marzzarella,
614 F.3d at 89 (stating threshold question is whether conduct is protected under
Second Amendment).
72. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (discussing two potential meanings of “presumptively lawful”). The court recognized the importance of understanding what
“presumptively lawful” means. See id. at 90–92 (discussing meaning of “presumptively lawful” even though possessing unmarked firearms not within list).
73. See, e.g., Lindsay Goldberg, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: Failing to
Establish a Standard for the Future, 68 MD. L. REV. 889, 899 (2009) (describing impact
of Heller’s silence on standard of review); Jeffrey M. Shaman, After Heller: What Now
for the Second Amendment?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1095, 1104 (2010) (noting Heller
rejected minimal scrutiny, but “declined to choose between strict and intermediate
scrutiny”).
74. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (“If all
that was required . . . was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would
have no effect.”); Robert A. Levy, District of Columbia v. Heller, What’s Next?, CATO
UNBOUND (July 14, 2008), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2008/07/14/robert-alevy/district-of-columbia-v-heller-whats-next/ (noting Court “categorically rejected
‘rational basis,’ ” and “will adopt some version of intermediate or heightened
scrutiny”).
75. See Kiehl, supra note 59, at 1145 (“The majority of courts . . . have employed intermediate scrutiny, which is emerging as a clear favorite . . . for Second
Amendment challenges.”); Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 55, at 466 n.13 (noting “trend toward a form of intermediate scrutiny requiring that the challenged
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scrutiny.76 One approach gaining momentum applies intermediate scrutiny where the challenged statute regulates conduct not directly within
“the core of the Second Amendment right,” and does not “severely limit”
lawful firearm possession.77 Courts that have used this approach usually
analogize it to the First Amendment’s tiered scrutiny framework.78 The
courts applying strict scrutiny reason that the Second Amendment protects a fundamental right, thus warranting the highest level of scrutiny.79
Regardless of the approach used, the lower courts have consistently
upheld firearm regulations.80 The problem is, however, that an unclear
rationale for the appropriate standard could produce differing results
when a novel issue arises.81 The Second Amendment context makes this
risk more significant because courts must be vigilant against the inherent
danger of weak gun control, but protective of an individual’s fundamental
rights.82
regulation be substantially related to an important governmental objective”). For
a further discussion of the lower courts applying intermediate scrutiny, see infra
notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
76. See United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We do not
see how the listed laws could be ‘presumptively’ constitutional if they were subject
to strict scrutiny”); Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187 (D.D.C.
2010) (noting “strict scrutiny . . . would not square with” Heller’s list), aff’d in part
670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
77. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that level of scrutiny “will depend on how close the law comes to the core
of the Second Amendment right, and the severity of the law’s burden on the
right”); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (choosing intermediate scrutiny because statute
“should merit a less stringent standard than the one that would have been applied
to” statutes in Heller).
78. For a discussion of courts analogizing to First Amendment scrutiny, see
infra notes 159, 165–68, 193–94 and accompanying text.
79. For a further discussion of strict scrutiny, see infra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Kiehl, supra note 59, at 1146 (“[E]ven under this highest level of
scrutiny, the courts have upheld the challenged regulation in every instance.”).
81. See Levy, supra note 74 (resolving “what weapons and persons can be regulated and what restrictions are permissible” are questions that “will depend . . . on
the standard of review”).
82. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (acknowledging “problem of handgun violence” and that law enforcement need “a variety of
tools for combating that problem”). The Court ruled however: “[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.
These include the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense
in the home.” Id. (balancing public safety concerns with fundamental rights); see
also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (noting city enacted
handgun bans to protect against violence, but “City’s handgun murder rate has
actually increased since the ban was enacted”). The Court also described several
residents that “have been the targets of threats and violence.” See id. at 3026–27
(discussing why residents want handguns for protection); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting application of strict scrutiny
“would likely foreclose an extraordinary number of regulatory measures, thus
handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to ‘prevent[ ] armed mayhem’ in public places”
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IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT OPENS FIRE
In United States v. Marzzarella, the Third Circuit ruled on an issue that
was not explicitly included in Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful” measures.83 The defendant challenged his felony conviction for possessing an
unmarked firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).84 In its opinion, the Third
Circuit set out its two prong test: (1) “[W]hether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee[,]” and (2) if yes, whether the law survives “some form
of means-end scrutiny.”85
Under the first prong, the court asked “whether the possession of an
unmarked firearm in the home is protected by the right to bear arms.”86
Answering this question required “a textual and historical inquiry” into
the Second Amendment’s original meaning.87 Applying Heller, the Third
Circuit reasoned that the “historical tradition” of Second Amendment protection included only those weapons “commonly owned by law-abiding citizens” at that time.88 Drawing on this historical approach, the defendant
argued that unmarked firearms were categorically protected under the
Second Amendment, because “firearms in common use” at the time of its
ratification did not have serial numbers.89 The court rejected this argument, noting that this type of “historically fact-bound approach” should
not be used to ultimately define what weapons the Second Amendment
protects.90 Serial numbers on firearms did not exist when the Second
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th
Cir. 2010))).
83. See United States v. Marzzarella 614 F.3d 85, 91–92 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27) (discussing list).
84. See id. at 88 (describing defendant’s Second Amendment argument). For
a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
85. Id. at 89 (outlining two-prong test).
86. Id. (explaining approach under first prong).
87. See David Kopel, Ezell’s Doctrinal Rules for the Second Amendment, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 8, 2011, 2:08 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/07/08/
ezell/ (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011)) (discussing Second Amendment’s historical meaning under Marzzarella’s first prong);
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89–90 (“Because ‘[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with
the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them,’ the
Court interpreted the text in light of its meaning at the time of ratification.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35)).
88. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 90 (“ ‘Miller stands only for the proposition that
the Second Amendment right . . . extends only to certain types of weapons—those
commonly owned by law abiding citizens.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting Heller, 554
U.S. at 623)).
89. See id. at 93 (discussing Marzzarella’s argument that unmarked firearms
are “categorically protected”).
90. See id. (“Heller cautions against using such a historically fact-bound approach when defining the types of weapons within the scope of the right.”). The
Second Amendment does not extend to “only those arms in existence in the 18th
century.” Id. at 93 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582) (discussing error in defendant’s argument).
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Amendment was ratified, and thus do not receive categorical protection
because they were not “within the contemplation of the pre-existing
right.”91
The defendant also argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on his right of self-defense.92 The court did not reject
this argument outright, but discussed the limits imposed on the right to
bear arms for self-defense.93 The court noted that unmarked firearms
could fall within Heller’s classification of “dangerous and unusual weapons,” and thus be beyond the Second Amendment right.94 Ultimately, the
court found it unclear whether the Second Amendment right included
“possession of unmarked firearms in the home,” but proceeded to the second prong of the test as if it did.95
Under the second prong, the Third Circuit engaged in a detailed discussion of the appropriate level of scrutiny.96 The court rejected a rational basis standard, stating Heller required “some form of heightened
scrutiny.”97 Acknowledging the uncertainty revolving around this issue,
the court ultimately settled on intermediate scrutiny.98 The court ruled
that law enforcement’s ability to trace serial numbers was a “substantial or
important interest,” and the statute “fit[ ] reasonably with that interest.”99
The Third Circuit faced an issue explicitly targeted by Heller’s list in
United States v. Barton. There, the defendant challenged his conviction for
91. Id. at 94 (rejecting categorical protection for class of weapons with characteristics that “citizens had no concept of” when Second Amendment was ratified).
92. See id. (describing defendant’s self-defense argument). The court focused
on the fact that the handgun’s functionality was not compromised, and thus any
“burden on Marzzarella’s ability to defend himself” was minimal. See id. (declaring
“[w]ith or without a serial number, a pistol is still a pistol”).
93. See id. (“[I]t cannot be the case that possession of a firearm in the home
for self-defense is a protected form of possession under all circumstances.”).
94. See id. at 95 (finding it “arguably possible” that Heller’s “exception for dangerous and unusual weapons” extends to unmarked firearms).
95. See id. (“[W]e cannot be certain that the possession of unmarked firearms
in the home is excluded from the right to bear arms.”). The court concluded the
statute “would pass constitutional muster even if it burden[ed] protected conduct. . . .” Id. (finding it unnecessary to decide if defendant’s Second Amendment
right was infringed).
96. See id. (evaluating statute “under the appropriate standard of constitutional scrutiny”).
97. See id. at 96 (noting Heller did not rule on standard of review, but “the fact
that the [handgun] ban was struck down . . . indicates some form of heightened
scrutiny must have applied”).
98. See id. at 97 (noting “[w]hile it is not free from doubt,” intermediate scrutiny should apply). The court did not decide which form of intermediate scrutiny.
See id. at 98 (“Although these standards differ in precise terminology, they essentially share the same substantive requirements.”). The court concluded the different types of intermediate scrutiny “all require the asserted governmental end to be
more than just legitimate . . . .” Id. (noting government interest must be either
“significant,” “substantial,” or “important.”).
99. See id. at 98–99 (ruling statute “passes muster” under intermediate
scrutiny).
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being a felon in possession of firearms.100 The Third Circuit held the
statute fell within Heller’s “categorical exceptions,” and thus could not be
facially unconstitutional.101 The court noted however, that a “presumptively lawful” regulation could still be invalidated if it was unconstitutional
“as applied” to a specific individual.102
The Third Circuit stated that to prevail on an “as-applied” challenged,
“Barton must present facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections.”103 In addition, the court looked to the
“traditional justifications” of the statute to determine if the policies behind
it supported a “permanent disability” on the defendant’s Second Amendment rights.104 Because Barton did not provide evidence to show why he
fell outside the statute’s scope, the Third Circuit upheld the dismissal of
his as-applied challenge and his conviction.105
100. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 2011). (describing
defendant’s claim that statute violated Second Amendment right). Barton had
sold a revolver to a police informant, after which the police searched his home. See
id. (reviewing facts of case). The police found an assortment of weapons, and
Barton was arrested because he had a prior felony conviction. See id. (finding
“seven pistols, five rifles, three shotguns, and various types of ammunition” at Barton’s residence). Barton was convicted under section 922(g)(1) which reads: “It
shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
101. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 172 (rejecting facial challenge “because Heller requires that we ‘presume,’ under most circumstances, that felon dispossession statutes regulate conduct which is unprotected by the Second Amendment . . . .”).
The court stated “certain ‘longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms’
are ‘presumptively lawful.’ ” See id. at 171 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). For a further discussion of these “presumptively lawful”
measures, see supra notes 54–55, 66–72, and accompanying text.
102. Barton, 633 F.3d at 173 (finding defendant’s “as-applied challenge” not
foreclosed by “presumptive validity of felon gun dispossession statutes”). The
court reasoned that Heller’s categorization of felon dispossession statutes as “presumptively lawful” implied that this “presumption may be rebutted.” See id. (discussing “as-applied” inquiry).
103. Id. at 174 (ruling defendant must show factual basis for “as-applied”
challenge).
104. See id. at 173 (“[T]o evaluate Barton’s as-applied challenge, we look to
the historical pedigree of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) to determine whether the traditional
justifications underlying the statute support a finding of permanent disability in
this case.”). The court found the statute was meant to keep firearms away from
people who would be a risk to society, and briefly discussed the legal foundation
for the statute. See id. at 173–74 (noting intent behind section 922(g) was “to keep
guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not be
trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society” (quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977))).
105. See id. at 174 (ruling Barton “failed to demonstrate that his circumstances place him outside the intended scope of” statute).
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The Third Circuit’s analyses in Marzzarella and Barton illustrate the
well-rounded approach lower courts take when evaluating challenges
under the Second Amendment.106 When a court is faced with a firearm
regulation challenge, the first divide will be whether the regulation falls
under Heller’s “presumptively lawful” list and the second divide will be
what level of scrutiny should be applied.107
A.

Analyzing the Barrage of “Presumptively Lawful” Regulations

Generally, courts summarily dismiss defense arguments that a regulation is “facially invalid”—requiring a showing that there is “no set of circumstances” where it could be valid—because that standard is difficult to
satisfy.108 With such a high burden, only “extreme and arbitrary and irrational laws” would fit that description.109 Instead, the defense should focus on distinguishing its case from Heller’s “presumptively lawful”
measures, because that would provide a good starting point to argue the
regulation restricts protected conduct.110
In refuting that argument, the State should argue that the regulation
is “presumptively lawful.”111 If the regulation falls within Heller’s categories, the State would have a strong basis for arguing it is constitutional.112
In Barton, the defendant’s situation was explicitly within Heller’s list, and
thus the Third Circuit began its analysis with a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of that regulation.113 Barton also shows, however, that a
“presumptively lawful” regulation will not automatically be found valid.114
106. For a discussion of this well-rounded approach, see supra notes 86–105,
infra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
107. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (outlining
two-prong test).
108. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 172 (describing defendant’s burden under “facial
challenge”).
109. See Civil Rights: The Heller Case, supra note 62, at 312 (describing statute
in Heller as example because it “ban[ned], effectively, all self-defense with
firearms . . . .”).
110. See Brief for Appellant at 9, United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3185), 2009 WL 3866720 (arguing defendant Marzzarella was
within Second Amendment’s protective scope because he “was not a felon nor was
he insane” and “[t]he type of firearm [he] possessed” was protected).
111. See Brief for the United States at 11, United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168
(3d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-2211), 2010 WL 2962436 (showing that felon dispossession
statute is within Heller’s list).
112. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 172 (noting “Heller requires that we ‘presume,’
under most circumstances,” that those statutes listed “regulate conduct which is
unprotected by the Second Amendment”).
113. See id. (citing Heller and McDonald for proposition that “The Supreme
Court has twice stated that felon gun dispossession statutes are ‘presumptively
lawful’ ”).
114. See id. at 173 (noting Heller’s characterization of “presumptively lawful” implies presumption may be rebutted) (emphasis added).
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Targeting the “As-Applied” Challenge

Defense attorneys should seize on Barton and stress that the Third
Circuit does not view Heller’s “presumptively lawful” list in a vacuum, but
analyzes the nature of that list in detail.115 Although under most circumstances, “presumptively lawful” statutes “regulate conduct which is unprotected by the Second Amendment,” attorneys should stress that they can
be unconstitutional “as applied” to a specific person.116 To make an effective “as-applied” argument, defense attorneys must satisfy Barton’s
requirements.117
Under Barton’s “as-applied” framework, the Third Circuit first examines the regulation’s history to determine if the prohibition on the defendant’s rights furthers that regulation’s policies.118 Defense attorneys
should argue that this history does not justify the infringement on the
defendant’s Second Amendment right.119 They must keep in mind that
the Third Circuit requires a “factual basis” for an “as-applied” challenge.120 Thus, the defense must provide evidence to distinguish the defendant from persons traditionally outside the scope of Second
Amendment protection.121 A defendant “convicted of a minor, non-violent crime” could stress they are “no more dangerous than a typical law
115. See Brief of Appellant at 21–22, Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (No. 09-2211), 2010
WL 2504123 (arguing list “cannot be . . . the beginning and end of the analysis”).
The Third Circuit agreed and engaged in a well-rounded analysis even after finding Heller’s list included prohibitions on felons. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 170–71, 74
(analyzing list and “as-applied” challenge).
116. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 173 (rejecting facial challenge but examines statute “as applied”); see e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, Post-Heller Decisions, in FIREARMS
LAW DESKBOOK § 1:4 (2011) (describing how felon can raise “as-applied” challenge
to rebut presumption of validity).
117. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 174 (discussing “as-applied” challenge).
118. See id. at 173–74 (examining “historical pedigree” of section 922(g) to
determine if underlying policies supported infringement on defendant’s right).
For a further discussion of Barton’s “historical pedigree” analysis, see supra notes
103–05 and accompanying text.
119. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 173–74 (examining historical support for felon
dispossession statutes). Some authorities have questioned this support. See United
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (stating “more recent authorities have not found evidence of longstanding
dispossession laws[,]” but argue “such laws did not exist and have questioned the
sources relied upon by the earlier authorities”); Civil Rights: The Heller Case, supra
note 62, at 308 (stating gun regulations “are modern inventions,” and “do not
reflect long-standing unbroken traditions”).
120. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 174 (stating defendant must have “a factual basis”
for his challenge).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 436 F. App’x 725, 726 (8th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting “as-applied challenge” because defendant did not present “ ‘facts about
himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections’ ” (quoting Barton,
633 F.3d at 174)).
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abiding citizen,” or a defendant with a “decades old” conviction could
show they no longer pose a “threat to society.”122
On the other side, the State should attack the defense’s “as-applied”
challenge.123 Here, the State should examine the regulation’s “historical
pedigree,” to show that the impact on the defendant’s Second Amendment rights is justified by congressional intent to keep the public safe.124
They can also highlight the fact that there is no absolute right to firearms.125 If the defendant does not have a “lawful purpose” for the conduct involving the firearm, that conduct will not be protected.126 This is
especially true if the State can demonstrate that the particular weapon has
value “primarily for persons seeking to use them for illicit purposes.”127
In Marzzarella and Barton, the Third Circuit addressed the “core lawful
purpose of self-defense.”128 Defense attorneys should analogize to Heller
and argue that the challenged regulation “makes it impossible” for lawabiding citizens to exercise their “inherent right of self-defense.”129 This
122. Barton, 633 F.3d at 174 (discussing ways defendants can distinguish their
situations); Julie McGrain, Court Rejects Second Amendment Challenges to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), THIRD CIRCUIT BLOG (Mar. 7, 2011), http://circuit3.blogspot.com/
2011/03/court-rejects-second-amendment.html (discussing potential defendants
that could make successful as applied challenges).
123. See Brief for the United States, supra note 111 at 19 (“Barton not only
fails to develop the [“as-applied”] argument . . . he fails to distinguish his case from
a run-of-the-mill prosecution under § 922(g)(1).”).
124. See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 29 n.18 (noting Congress
sought “to regulate . . . firearms sales and transfers to assist law enforcement . . . in
combating crime” (citing DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO,
& FIREARMS, FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS
TRAFFICKERS 25 (2000)), available at http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/
downloads/pdf/Following_the_Gun%202000.pdf)). In pursuing these objectives,
“serial numbers arose, and later, firearms tracing.” Id. (discussing important purpose tracing serves).
125. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (stating
Second Amendment does not create “ ‘a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose’ ” (quoting District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008))); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding Heller could register handgun “[a]ssuming that
[he] is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights”).
126. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect
those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”);
See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 111, at 16 (“[T]he Second Amendment’s history and purpose support the proposition that felons are categorically
excluded from the Amendment’s protections.”).
127. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding
no “lawful purpose served by obliterating a serial number”); see, e.g., Second Amendment Handgun Obliterated Serial Number 18 U.S.C. 922(k), PA. LAW WEEKLY, Aug. 10,
2010 (“There was no compelling reason why a law-abiding citizen would prefer an
unmarked firearm.”).
128. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94 (describing defendant’s self-defense argument); Barton, 633 F.3d at 174–75 (same).
129. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629–30 (showing that statutes impermissibly infringe on “inherent right of self-defense”). This right is “central to the Second
Amendment.” Id. at 640 (discussing self-defense).
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will be particularly effective if the statute significantly hinders the defendant’s ability to use a weapon in the home.130 Defense attorneys must
keep in mind, however, that keeping a firearm in the home is not sufficient to establish a “lawful purpose” of self-defense.131
Moreover, most firearm regulations will not be as strict as the statute
in Heller.132 The State could emphasize that point to show that the challenged regulation is much narrower in its scope.133 Additionally, the
Third Circuit has stated that the right of self-defense is limited when it is
regulated by a “presumptively lawful” statute, so it is extremely important
for defense attorneys to distinguish the defendant’s situation from those
in Heller’s list.134 After making their arguments under Barton’s framework,
practitioners should move to the two-prong test of Marzzarella.135
C.

Combating a Novel Issue with Two Prongs of Ammunition

The two-prong test articulated in Marzzarella provides guidance to
courts and practitioners facing a novel Second Amendment issue.136
When confronted with regulations not explicitly within Heller’s “presumptively lawful” list, courts find it more challenging to apply Heller and have
130. See id. at 628 (stating regulation “extends . . . to the home, where the
need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute”); see, e.g., Brief of
Appellant, supra note 115 at 15 (arguing right of self-defense “sounds with particular strength when exercised in the home”).
131. See United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 601 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding
conviction of aiding and abetting felon’s possession of firearm). The Third Circuit
stated that the defendant had a “right to keep [the weapon] in her home,” but the
Second Amendment “did not give her the right to facilitate [her boyfriend’s] possession of the weapon.” See id. at 602 (ruling statute does not infringe on protected
conduct even if defendant possessed firearm for self-defense) (citation omitted)).
132. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“Few laws in the history of our Nation have
come close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.”).
133. See United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 599 (W.D. Pa.
2009) (noting statutes in Heller were “far broader in scope”). The burden imposed
by section 922(k) was “practically negligible” compared to the handgun ban in
Heller. See id. (distinguishing regulations); see, e.g., Keith Donoghue, Upholding
§ 922(k) Ban on Unmarked Firearms, Court Charts Course for Second Amendment Challenges, THIRD CIRCUIT BLOG (July 29, 2010), http://circuit3.blogspot.com/2010/
07/upholding-922k-ban-on-unmarked-firearms.html (noting “decisive factor” was
that statute “ ‘restricts possession of weapons which have been made less susceptible to tracing . . . not “any otherwise lawful firearm.’ ” (quoting Marzzarella, 614
F.3d at 101))).
134. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94 (“[I]t cannot be the case that possession of
a firearm in the home for self-defense is a protected form of possession under all
circumstances.”); see also United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174–75 (3d Cir.
2011) (noting that even if person has firearm for self-defense, “ ‘a felony conviction
disqualifies an individual from asserting’ ” that right (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
at 92)).
135. For a discussion of practitioner arguments under Marzzarella’s test, see
infra notes 140–83 and accompanying text.
136. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95 (outlining two prong approach).
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recognized the need to proceed with caution.137 This difficulty was particularly evident in Marzzarella, where the Third Circuit “assumed” the defendant’s conduct was protected so it could apply the second prong.138
Practitioners on both sides should address each prong of Marzzarella because the Third Circuit’s tendency is to move through both prongs regardless of the result under the first.139
1.

The First Prong: Looking Through the Second Amendment’s Scope

Under the first prong, the Third Circuit inquires whether the challenged regulation infringes on conduct within the Second Amendment’s
protection.140 The defense would argue that the regulation hinders protected conduct.141 If the conduct is unprotected, the court’s analysis ends
there and the regulation is upheld.142 The defense should show the defendant is “categorically different” from people historically understood to
be outside the Second Amendment’s protective scope.143 Here, the defense can emphasize that Heller’s list did not explicitly cover the defendant’s situation.144 The Third Circuit has been cautious when asked to
characterize regulations as “presumptively lawful” when they were not
137. See Gould, supra note 32, at 1550 (noting courts can “easily dispose of
challenges” falling under Heller’s list, “[b]ut when the factual scenarios stray from
those listed in Heller, the lower federal courts fall into disarray”); Kiehl, supra note
59, at 1149 (“While lower courts have fairly easily disposed of challenges to gun
laws specifically mentioned in Heller’s laundry list of presumptively lawful regulations, they have struggled more with regulations not included in the Heller list or
covered by its historical test.”). The Third Circuit has discussed the difficulty in
dealing with this area of law. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 101 (noting that “Second
Amendment doctrine remains in its nascency, and lower courts must proceed deliberately when addressing regulations unmentioned by Heller”); see also Barton, 633
F.3d at 172 n.4 (noting difficulty in applying Heller to novel problem).
138. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95 (applying second prong despite uncertainty of result under first prong).
139. See, e.g., Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 831 (D.N.J. 2012) (ruling statute fell outside Second Amendment right, but addressed “under Marzzarella’s second prong, whether the challenged provisions would survive the
appropriate level of scrutiny” due to unsettled nature of law). For a further discussion of Marzzarella’s application of both prongs, see supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text.
140. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 (“First, we ask whether the challenged law
imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee.”).
141. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 110, at 9 (arguing Marzzarella’s conduct “lies squarely within the scope of the Second Amendment’s right to possess
firearms in the home”).
142. See United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 602 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding aiding and abetting felon to possess weapon was “beyond the scope of Second Amendment protection,” and thus “inquiry under Marzzarella [was] complete”).
143. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010)) (finding that felons
were “categorically different” from others in terms of Second Amendment right).
144. For further discussion of this argument, see infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
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listed by Heller.145 To stress that the defendant’s conduct is protected, the
defense should assert some “lawful purpose” for the firearm.146 To bolster
this argument, the defense can distinguish the type of weapon from those
“dangerous and usual weapons” unprotected by the Second
Amendment.147
The State should argue that the regulated conduct is outside the
scope of Second Amendment protection.148 Here, the State ought to reiterate that Heller’s “presumptively lawful” list was not exhaustive.149 The
Third Circuit is particularly vigilant when analyzing regulations not explicitly within Heller’s list, so the State must demonstrate why the regulation
should be put within that list of exclusions.150 This can be done by showing the regulation is “longstanding”—as were the statutes in Heller.151 The
State could also draw focus to the regulation’s policies and analogize them
to policies underlying “presumptively lawful” statutes.152 Here, practition145. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (“[P]rudence counsels caution when extending these recognized exceptions to novel regulations unmentioned by Heller.”); see also Huet, 665 F.3d at 602 (stating courts “must tread carefully when
deciding whether to find conduct not explicitly identified by the Heller Court as
subject to ‘presumptively lawful’ restrictions as unprotected by the Second Amendment.” (citing Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 101)).
146. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95 (“ ‘[T]he Second Amendment does not
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 625 (2008))).
147. See id. (“[A] handgun with an obliterated serial number seems distinct
from a weapon like a short-barreled shotgun.”). The Marzzarella court found no
“lawful purpose” in having unmarked firearms, but distinguished those from “dangerous and unusual weapons” listed by Heller. See id. (finding unmarked firearm
“no more damaging than a marked firearm”).
148. See id. at 89 (“Our threshold inquiry, then, is whether 922(k) regulates
conduct that falls within the Scope of the Second Amendment.”).
149. See id. at 92–93 (stating Heller’s list “is not exhaustive,” and thus “additional classes of restrictions” could exist). The Third Circuit noted that there is no
set approach “for identifying these additional restrictions,” but found Heller did
not say the “pre-ratification presence is the only avenue to a categorical exception.” See id. at 93 (discussing other potential exclusions).
150. See id. (“[P]rudence counsels caution when extending these recognized
exceptions to novel regulations unmentioned by Heller.”).
151. See Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 828–31 (D.N.J. 2012) (ruling handgun permit law “presumptively lawful”). The district court stated: “To the
extent that New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law may implicate some narrow right to
carry a firearm outside the home, the challenged provisions would not necessarily
burden any protected conduct.” Id. at 829 The court classified the law as a “ ‘longstanding’ licensing provision of the kind that Heller identified as presumptively lawful.’ ” Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 n.26). The Third Circuit
characterized these “longstanding regulations” as “exceptions . . . so that the regulated conduct falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment.” Id. (citing Barton, 633 F.3d at 172).
152. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (describing how statute prohibiting “possession by substance abusers” would be valid “because it presumably serves the
same purpose as restrictions on possession by felons”). Regulations preventing
possession by “dangerous” people have a good basis for being “presumptively law-
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ers can highlight the need for law enforcement officials to have the means
to protect the public against gun violence.153
The State should further assert that, even if the defendant’s conduct
is protected, the Second Amendment does not foster an absolute right to
firearms.154 Practitioners can bolster this argument by analogizing to the
“categorical exceptions” in First Amendment jurisprudence, which deny
protection to certain types of speech.155 Here, it is important that practitioners stress the recognized exclusions and limitations to the Second
Amendment right, because courts will likely carve out more exclusions as
this area of law develops.156
2.

The Second Prong: Triggering the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny

Marzzarella’s second prong sets out a framework to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.157 This is particularly useful to courts and practitioners because there is no set standard of review in this area of law.158
Marzzarella drew from First Amendment tiered scrutiny: the least stringent
ful.” See, e.g., United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting
“§ 922(g)(3) has the same historical pedigree as other portions of § 922(g)”);
United States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 280 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating intent behind section 922(g)(3) was “to keep firearms out of the possession of drug abusers,
a dangerous class of individuals”).
153. See, e.g., Appellee’s Brief at 55, Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d
1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-7036), 2010 WL 5108973 (“[E]ven if there is nothing to fear when the truly law-abiding possess guns with obliterated serial numbers,
the government may prohibit such possession to ‘serve[ ] a law enforcement interest in enabling the tracing of weapons.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98)).
154. For a further discussion of this argument, see supra notes 35, 38, 125–26,
and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (comparing “categorical limits on the possession of firearms” with categorical limits
found in First Amendment); Anderson, supra note 61, at 563 (“Categorical exclusions are most commonly used in First Amendment” case law, but they “play a role
in Second Amendment jurisprudence.”).
156. See, e.g., Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641 (“Categorical limits on the possession of
firearms would not be a constitutional anomaly. Think of the First Amendment,
which has long had categorical limits: obscenity, defamation, incitement to crime,
and others.”); see generally Blocher, supra note 66, at 377 (providing in-depth analysis of Heller’s “categorical” approach and implications for Second Amendment
doctrine).
157. See, e.g., Donoghue, supra note 133 (stating under second prong, “the
court must next determine whether the law survives the appropriate ‘form of
means-end scrutiny’ ” (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89)).
158. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 26, at 1074 (“Of the several unanswered
questions left in the wake of Heller, the level of scrutiny has the most potential to
transform American gun regulations.”); Persky, supra note 64, at 16 (noting that
because Supreme Court “failed to articulate a clear standard of review, lower
courts have had to wing it”); Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 55, at 438 (calling
level of scrutiny “the most important piece of plumbing that will need to be
installed”).
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is rational basis, followed by intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny is the
most burdensome.159
The defense should urge the court to apply strict scrutiny so the regulation is subjected to the harshest test.160 The trend amongst the circuits
is to apply intermediate scrutiny, but the Third Circuit has explicitly acknowledged that certain situations could warrant the highest standard.161
For example, strict scrutiny could be triggered by regulations that directly
implicate a “law abiding citizen’s” right of self-defense.162 Self-defense is a
“fundamental right,” but defense attorneys must be mindful that not all
fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny.163 More importantly, defense
attorneys must show the defendant is “law abiding,” which is similar to
demonstrating a “lawful purpose.”164
It would be beneficial for defense attorneys to draw on First Amendment cases where “content based” restrictions on speech failed under
strict scrutiny.165 These restrictions could provide useful parallels where a
firearm regulation bans an entire class of weapons, or a class of people
from having weapons.166 In that situation, the defense ought to highlight
159. For an overview of standards of review see Anderson, supra note 61, at
557–63 (discussing rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny).
160. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 115, at 20 (arguing Heller requires more
than rational basis). Heller also rejected a “freestanding ‘interest balancing’ approach,” leaving intermediate and strict scrutiny. See id. at 22 (quoting District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008)). The defense stated intermediate
scrutiny was inappropriate and argued for strict scrutiny. See id. (arguing for highest standard).
161. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“Whether or not strict scrutiny may apply to particular Second Amendment challenges, it is not the case that it must be applied to all Second Amendment challenges.”); see, e.g., Donoghue, supra note 133 (noting Marzzarella “further
suggest[ed] that at least some gun laws may be subject to strict scrutiny”).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“[A]ny law that would burden the ‘fundamental’ core right of self-defense in the
home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny.”); Piszczatoski v.
Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 834 (D.N.J. 2012) (noting strict scrutiny “is triggered by
the core of the right”); Perkins, supra note 26, at 1079 (arguing for strict scrutiny
where “a particular gun regulation directly interferes with the fundamental right
of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment”). Most firearm regulations
do not directly infringe on the “core” right to self-defense like Heller. See id. (noting strict scrutiny inappropriate “to evaluate . . . vast majority of gun regulations”).
163. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t does not logically follow[ ] that strict scrutiny is called for whenever a fundamental right is at stake.”); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96 (“Strict scrutiny does not
apply automatically” to “enumerated right”).
164. For further discussion of the “lawful purpose” requirement, see supra
notes 126–27, 146–47 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant, supra note 110, at 24–28 (discussing content based restrictions); Anderson, supra note 61, at 563 (“[S]trict scrutiny . . .
provides the default rule for assessing content based regulations of speech”).
166. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 110, at 24 (arguing that “ban on the
possession of any firearm without a serial number in the privacy of a citizen’s home
is the equivalent of content-based regulation”).
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that the fourth, seventh, ninth, and tenth circuits have explicitly drawn on
Marzzarella’s First Amendment analysis.167 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court drew parallels to First Amendment precedent, suggesting approval
of this approach in a widely unsettled area of law.168
The State should urge the court to reject strict scrutiny and adopt a
lower standard.169 It can make an argument for a rational basis standard,
but that is unlikely to be accepted.170 There is a much stronger argument
for intermediate scrutiny because the Third Circuit applied that standard.171 Practitioners could emphasize that the majority of other circuits
apply intermediate scrutiny.172 Furthermore, they could draw focus to
courts that have explicitly drawn on the Third Circuit’s approach under
that standard.173 The State should keep in mind that in such an unsettled
167. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786–87 (9th Cir. 2011) (asking
whether restrictions leaves “law-abiding citizens with reasonable alternative means”
for obtaining firearms (citing Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95)), aff’d in part en banc, 681
F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706–07 (7th Cir.
2011) (noting other circuits have “begun to adapt First Amendment doctrine to
the Second Amendment context” including Third Circuit); United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (joining other circuits that look at First
Amendment “as a guide in developing a standard of review”); United States v.
Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Marzzarella’s First Amendment analogies); United States v. Laurent, No. 11-322, 2011 WL 6004606, at *19
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2011) (drawing on First Amendment “to define what constitutes
a substantial burden” and standard of review (citing Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96)).
168. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“Of course
the right [to bear arms] was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of
free speech was not.”). The Court stated “[j]ust as the First Amendment protects
modern forms of communications . . . the Second Amendment extends . . . to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at
the time of the founding.” Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
169. See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 20 (arguing against strict
scrutiny).
170. For a further discussion of the rejection of rational basis, see supra note
74 and accompanying text.
171. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (applying intermediate scrutiny).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2012)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to statute prohibiting persons subject to domestic
violence protection order from possessing firearms); Nordyke, 644 F.3d at 793 (upholding ordinance banning guns on country property under intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (ruling statute
prohibiting gun possession by “domestic violence misdemeanants” had “substantial
relationship” to “important governmental interest”); United States v. Yancey, 621
F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding statute prohibiting drug users from possessing firearms passed intermediate scrutiny).
173. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2011)
(stating Marzzarella’s two prong approach “has been followed by the Third, Fourth,
and Tenth Circuits”); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 443 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2011) (noting “sliding scale test” in Marzzarella to determine appropriate standard); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (drawing
on Marzzarella in deciding on intermediate scrutiny), cert. denied, 10-11212, 2011
WL 2516854 (2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“[A] two-part approach to Second Amendment claims seems appropriate under
Heller, as explained by the Third Circuit”); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792,
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area of law, the lower courts will likely draw from others that share the
same reasoning.174
Additionally, the State can show why the right to self-defense is not
implicated, and that the regulation would not pose a “substantial burden”
on that right.175 Practitioners should also distinguish the regulation from
“content based” restrictions on speech.176 This can be done by stressing
the regulation’s narrow scope, and distinguishing it from the all-encompassing statutes struck down by Heller.177 A narrow regulation that does
not pose a severe burden on the defendant’s rights will warrant intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.178
Regardless of the standard a court applies, practitioners on both sides
should be aware of their case’s expected result under all three standards.179 The Third Circuit’s tendency is to apply strict scrutiny after already applying intermediate scrutiny.180 This reflects a need to cover all
the bases when dealing with an undeveloped area of law.181 Furthermore,
practitioners must keep in mind there is no consensus on the type of inter800–01 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny under Marzzarella), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1258
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding intermediate scrutiny “the more appropriate standard”);
Peterson v. LaCabe, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176–77 (D. Colo. 2011) (noting Tenth
Circuit adopted two prong approach articulated by Third Circuit).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We
agree with the Second and Ninth Circuits that Heller’s list . . . is not dicta.”); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95 (drawing on other circuits’ examples of “dangerous and
unusual weapons”); Brief for the United States, supra note 111, at 11 (listing cases
from all circuits upholding felon dispossession statutes).
175. See Heller, 670 F.3d at 1257 (stating level of scrutiny “depends on the
nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law
burdens the right” (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 682)). Thus, “a regulation that
imposes a substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense . . . must have a
strong justification, whereas a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden
should be proportionately easier to justify.” Id. (applying tiered scrutiny framework to Second Amendment).
176. See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 24 (distinguishing statute
banning unmarked weapons from content based restriction).
177. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (stating section 922(k) “does not come
close to [the] level of infringement” in Heller, which warrantied strict scrutiny).
178. See, e.g., Kiehl, supra note 59, at 1164 (noting where “core right” is not
infringed, regulations “should receive a . . . lower level of review—intermediate
scrutiny”); Kopel, supra note 87 (noting “rigor” of scrutiny depends on “how close
the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the
law’s burden on that right”).
179. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 61, at 556 (providing overview of various
standards of scrutiny).
180. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98–99 (applying strict scrutiny after statute
passed intermediate scrutiny). The Third Circuit found a “compelling interest” in
obtaining information about firearms, which was “narrowly tailored” to that interest. See id. at 99–100 (finding regulation “narrowly tailored” because it did not
“burden more possession than necessary”).
181. See, e.g., Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 831 (D.N.J. 2012)
(finding statute outside Second Amendment’s scope, but addressed whether it
would survive scrutiny due to unsettled nature of law).
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mediate scrutiny to apply.182 In practice, the various forms mean essentially the same thing, but it would be useful to have a general
understanding of each of them.183
VI. LOCK & LOAD
The fact that the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Marzzarella and
other circuits sharing the Third Circuit’s reasoning may signal approval of
this reasonable approach to this area of law.184 Second Amendment jurisprudence is still unclear—Heller purposefully left certain questions unanswered.185 Lower courts facing a whirlwind of litigation have little
guidance, and thus must draw from the reasoning of other courts.186
The Third Circuit cases have impacted the Second Amendment terrain.187 Marzzarella’s scrutiny analysis and Barton’s “as-applied” framework
show that the concept of an individual right has affected the approach to
Second Amendment challenges.188 There is a growing trend amongst the
182. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 (noting different forms of intermediate
scrutiny).
183. For a further discussion of intermediate scrutiny’s various forms, see
supra note 98 and accompanying text.
184. For examples of a denial of certiorari, see supra notes 167, 174, and accompanying text.
185. For a further discussion of the uncertainty generated by Heller, see supra
notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
186. See THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 6.18.922A6.18.924B (2009) (Firearm Offenses), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/
criminaljury/Nov2010/Final%20Chap%206%20Firearm%20Offenses.pdf (providing instructions for various firearm offenses with notes of relevant decisions from
different circuits). Marzzarella is described at 6.18.922K entitled “Possession of
Firearm With Serial Number Removed, Obliterated, or Altered (18 U.S.C.
§ 922(k)).” See id. at 34–35 (discussing Marzzarella).
187. See Shannon P. Duffy, In the Wake of “Heller,” 3rd Circuit OKs Ban on Unnumbered Guns, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July 30, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202464062676&In_Wake_of_Heller_3rd_Circuit_OKs_Ban_on_Un
numbered_Guns [hereinafter Duffy, In the Wake of Heller] (describing Marzzarella
as “an important Second Amendment decision that charts a course for evaluating
the validity of gun laws”); Third Circuit Rejects Second Amendment Attack on Federal
Crime of Possessing Gun with Obliterated Serial Number, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (July 29,
2010), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2010/07/
third-circuit-rejects-second-amendment-attack-on-federal-crime-of-possessing-gunwith-obliterated-se.html (“[T]he Third Circuit’s work in Marzzarella is a must-read
for anyone following the development of Second Amendment jurisprudence.”).
Commentators even recognized Marzzarella’s significance before it was decided.
See Shannon P. Duffy, Erie Case to Test Limits of Gun Possession Rights, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=120244
4116070&Erie_Case_to_Test_Limits_of_Gun_Possession_Rights (stating Marzzarella “promises to test the limits” of Heller).
188. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(Mark)?
Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1264
(2009) (stating that when analyzing felon dispossession challenges, “some federal
courts are finding that the characterization of . . . an individual right affects their
analysis”). Courts are bound by Heller, but this idea of an individual Second
Amendment right has “plainly entered into the courts’ consciousness and reason-
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circuits and district courts to engage in deeper inquiries, even where the
case falls into Heller’s “presumptively lawful” list.189 This gives practitioners more opportunities, but has not been enough to remove the defendant from the line of fire.190 Felon dispossession statutes, like the one at
issue in Barton, have been upheld after in-depth analyses.191 Additionally,
Barton’s analysis of the Second Amendment’s scope sets up a useful frameing process” in a new way. Id. at 1265 (noting “lower courts are taking cognizance
of the Heller decision in a way that did not happen” with earlier precedent).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he government does not get a free pass simply because Congress has established a ‘categorical ban’; it still must prove that the ban is constitutional . . . .”),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010). The presumption of validity means “there must
exist the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional.” See id. (emphasis added) (discussing “as-applied” framework); United States v. Pruess, 416 F. App’x
274, 275 (4th Cir. 2011) (remanding case because district court failed to “conduct
an analysis of a challenged regulation in light of Heller”); United States v. Ayotte,
No. 11-00156, 2012 WL 112639, at *9 (D. Me. Jan. 11, 2012) (addressing defendant’s “as applied” challenge); United States v. Laurent, No. 11-322, 2011 WL
6004606, at *19–22 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2011) (providing detailed overview of steps in
analysis under Second Amendment); United States v. Hauck, No. 11-130, 2011 WL
5117614, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2011) (addressing “as applied” challenges).
190. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 188, at 1264 (finding individual
rights notion has affected lower courts’ analyses, but “not always sufficiently to get
the accused off the hook”); see, e.g., United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110,
113 (1st Cir. 2011) (ruling defendant did not make “as-applied” challenge by asserting “no prior convictions for any violent felony”). The Third Circuit recently
upheld an indictment for aiding and abetting a felon’s possession of a firearm
where the defendant legally possessed a rifle in the home she shared with her
felon boyfriend. See United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 601 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting indictment “d[id] not allege that Huet’s possession . . . violated the law,” but
Huet “aided and abetted” felon’s possession). The court noted the problem of
misusing felon dispossession statutes “to subject law-abiding cohabitants to liability
simply for possessing a weapon in the home,” but ruled there was not enough
evidence to show the State overreached its bounds. See id. (stating Huet’s claims
about “circumstances of her possession” not developed enough).
191. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding
statutes); Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 113 (“All of the circuits to face the issue post
Heller have rejected blanket challenges to felon in possession laws.”); United States
v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011) (ruling felon gun dispossession statute
did not violate Second Amendment or Commerce Clause); Williams, 616 F.3d at
692–94 (upholding felon dispossession statute under intermediate scrutiny), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010); United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir.
2010) (noting “criminal prohibitions on felons” do not violate Second Amendment right), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 158 (2010); United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d
768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting Heller established that “statutes disqualifying
felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend
the Second Amendment”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3399 (2010); United States v.
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “even given the Second
Amendment’s individual right to bear arms, felons’ Second Amendment rights can
be reasonably restricted”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 294 (2010); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (relying on Heller’s list in upholding
felon’s conviction for possessing firearm); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x
501, 508 (6th Cir. 2010) (relying on Heller’s exclusion in upholding conviction
under felon dispossession statute), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3345 (2010); United
States v. Stuckey, 317 Fed. App’x. 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2009) (relying on Heller’s list in
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work.192 Marzzarella’s breakdown of First Amendment scrutiny is useful
for courts and practitioners faced with novel issues.193 One commentator
called Marzzarella “illustrative” of how lower courts are interpreting Heller
as Second Amendment jurisprudence becomes more developed.194 The
Heller decision upended nearly seventy years of Second Amendment interpretation, leaving the area of law muddled with uncertainty.195 The Third
Circuit’s approach can help forge a path for practitioners to follow as the
lower courts continue to adjudicate “in the shadow of Heller.”196
upholding convictions); United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (relying on Heller’s list in upholding felon’s conviction).
192. See, e.g., Persky, supra note 64, at 14 (criticizing Heller’s failure to “provide
a concrete framework to help lower courts determine the constitutionality of challenged gun control laws”).
193. See Duffy, In the Wake of Heller, supra note 187 (stating “most important
lesson” from Marzzarella is to look to “extensive jurisprudence on First Amendment
claims for guidance”); Third Circuit Rejects Second Amendment Attack, supra note 187
(“Marzzarella . . . proceeds deliberately and . . . cover[s] more Second Amendment
ground than any other opinion I can recall from the last two years.”).
194. See Shaman, supra note 73, at 1106 (stating Marzzarella is “illustrative of
how the lower federal courts have construed Heller”).
195. See Winkler, supra note 64 (calling Heller’s lack of future guidance “one
of [its] great failings”).
196. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 188, at 1265.
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